Further results on permit markets with market power and cheating.

DOI10.1006/JEEM.2001.1216zbMath1037.91075OpenAlexW2051907287MaRDI QIDQ1864830

Arun S. Malik

Publication date: 23 March 2003

Published in: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeem.2001.1216

zbMATH Keywords

noncompliancemarket powerenforcementpollution markets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (2)

Designing a double auction mechanism for the re-allocation of emission permits ⋮ Cap-and-trade, taxes, and distributional conflict

This page was built for publication: Further results on permit markets with market power and cheating.