Distributions for the first-order approach to principal-agent problems

DOI10.1007/S00199-001-0250-YzbMath1030.91018OpenAlexW2057897207MaRDI QIDQ1865172

Sandrine Spaeter, Marco Li Calzi

Publication date: 25 March 2003

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10278/22577

zbMATH Keywords

Principal-agent problemConvexity in effortFirst-order approachMonotone likelihood ratio

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Utility theory (91B16)

Related Items (13)

Relational contracts and the first-order approach ⋮ A modified homotopy method for solving the principal-agent bilevel programming problem ⋮ Strategies in the principal-agent model ⋮ Information space conditions for the first-order approach in agency problems ⋮ Relative income concerns, dismissal, and the use of pay-for-performance ⋮ Minimum payments and induced effort in moral hazard problems ⋮ Globally convergent homotopy method for designing piecewise linear deterministic contractual function ⋮ Normative properties of stock market equilibrium with moral hazard ⋮ Common shocks and relative compensation ⋮ Moral hazard and the spanning condition without the first-order approach ⋮ Multitask principal-agent problems: Optimal contracts, fragility, and effort misallocation ⋮ Globally convergent method for designing twice spline contractual function ⋮ Globally convergent homotopy algorithm for solving the KKT systems to the principal-agent bilevel programming

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