What do uncertainty-averse decision-makers believe?

DOI10.1007/s001990100187zbMath1040.91027OpenAlexW2002538936MaRDI QIDQ1865202

Matthew J. Ryan

Publication date: 25 March 2003

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990100187

zbMATH Keywords

normal form gamesbiseparable preferencesepistemic foundations of decisions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Noncooperative games (91A10) Utility theory (91B16)

Related Items (14)

On stochastic independence under ambiguity ⋮ The evolutionary stability of optimism, pessimism, and complete ignorance ⋮ Support notions for belief functions ⋮ Bargaining with subjective mixtures ⋮ Strategic games beyond expected utility ⋮ Dynamic consistency for non-expected utility preferences ⋮ Granny versus game theorist: Ambiguity in experimental games ⋮ Coherent Dempster-Shafer equilibrium and ambiguous signals ⋮ OPTIMISM AND PESSIMISM IN GAMES ⋮ Increasing uncertainty: a definition ⋮ More likely than unlikely ⋮ Games in context: equilibrium under ambiguity for belief functions ⋮ Correlated Nash equilibrium ⋮ Strategic uncertainty and equilibrium selection in discontinuous games

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