Can double auctions control monopoly and monopsony power in emissions trading markets?

DOI10.1006/JEEM.2001.1195zbMath1032.91606OpenAlexW2067165656MaRDI QIDQ1865354

R. Andrew Muller, Rob Godby, Stuart Mestelman, John M. Spraggon

Publication date: 26 March 2003

Published in: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/650367a5436142a68d559805d7fde497130c03f9

zbMATH Keywords

pricemarket powerdiscriminationemissions tradingtradable permitsdouble auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (2)

Designing a double auction mechanism for the re-allocation of emission permits ⋮ Assigning pollution permits: are uniform auctions efficient?

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