Separation of joint plan equilibrium payoffs from the min-max functions.

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00016-7zbMath1038.91014OpenAlexW2086985965MaRDI QIDQ1867025

Robert Samuel Simon

Publication date: 2 April 2003

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(02)00016-7

zbMATH Keywords

2-person gamesgames in extensive formmultistage and repeated games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Games in extensive form (91A18) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (5)

Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games ⋮ Repeated Games with Incomplete Information ⋮ Sender-receiver games with cooperation ⋮ Long persuasion games ⋮ Equilibrium existence and topology in some repeated games with incomplete information

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Some results on the existence of Nash equilibria for non-zero sum games with incomplete information
• An analog of the minimax theorem for vector payoffs
• Bi-convexity and bi-martingales
• The existence of equilibria in certain games, separation for families of convex functions and a theorem of Borsuk-Ulam type
• Equilibria with Communication in a Job Market Example
• Nonzero-Sum Two-Person Repeated Games with Incomplete Information

This page was built for publication: Separation of joint plan equilibrium payoffs from the min-max functions.