Calibration and Bayesian learning.

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00010-6zbMath1038.91015MaRDI QIDQ1867026

Nurlan Turdaliev

Publication date: 2 April 2003

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian learningCalibrationRepeated gamesForecast

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Correlated equilibrium in games with type-dependent strategies
• Bayesian learning in normal form games
• Bayesian learning leads to correlated equilibria in normal form games
• Calibrated learning and correlated equilibrium
• Calibrated forecasting and merging
• Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium
• The Well-Calibrated Bayesian
• Prediction, Optimization, and Learning in Repeated Games
• Bayesian Representation of Stochastic Processes under Learning: de Finetti Revisited
• Any Inspection is Manipulable
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