Eliciting information from multiple experts
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1867028
DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00003-9zbMath1024.91001MaRDI QIDQ1867028
Publication date: 2 April 2003
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Noncooperative games (91A10) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Decision theory for games (91A35)
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Cites Work
- Interested experts and policy advice: Multiple referrals under open rule
- Correlation without mediation: Expanding the set of equilibrium outcomes by ``cheap pre-play procedures
- A Model of Expertise
- Universal Mechanisms
- Strategic Information Transmission
- Fair Distribution Protocols or How the Players Replace Fortune
- Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case
- Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
