Aspiration-based and reciprocity-based rules in learning dynamics for symmetric normal-form games
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Publication:1867362
DOI10.1006/jmps.2001.1409zbMath1027.91012OpenAlexW2145637583MaRDI QIDQ1867362
Ernan E. Haruvy, Dale O. II Stahl
Publication date: 2 April 2003
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Psychology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/1396fd198ff2e052573ad29f976f97bc3125ea60
(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Experimental studies (91A90)
Related Items (4)
The neutrality of money revisited with a bottom-up approach: Decentralisation, limited information and bounded rationality ⋮ Between-game rule learning in dissimilar symmetric normal-form games ⋮ Promotion of cooperation in evolutionary game dynamics with local information ⋮ Coordination after gains and losses: is prospect theory's value function predictive for games?
Uses Software
Cites Work
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