Subscription mechanisms for network formation.

DOI10.1006/jeth.2001.2920zbMath1038.91010OpenAlexW2137714003MaRDI QIDQ1867527

Eyal Winter, Suresh Mutuswami

Publication date: 2 April 2003

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/a8e938f2e25b60a50ab88b3d7cd5673d5ff3cf6d

zbMATH Keywords

payoffsmodelNetworks mechanismplanner

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Games involving graphs (91A43)

Related Items (16)

The formation of networks with transfers among players ⋮ Definitions of equilibrium in network formation games ⋮ Allocating value among farsighted players in network formation ⋮ Forming efficient networks ⋮ A note on network formation with decay ⋮ Listen before you link: optimal monitoring rules for communication networks ⋮ A non-cooperative approach to the ordinal Shapley-Shubik rule ⋮ A non-cooperative approach to the folk rule in minimum cost spanning tree problems ⋮ Forming coalitions and the Shapley NTU value ⋮ Networks and Stability ⋮ Strongly stable networks ⋮ Allocation rules for network games ⋮ Bidding for the surplus: realizing efficient outcomes in economic environments ⋮ Noncooperative cost spanning tree games with budget restrictions ⋮ Realizing fair outcomes in minimum cost spanning tree problems through non-cooperative mechanisms ⋮ Opportune moment strategies for a cost spanning tree game

Cites Work

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• Simple subscription mechanisms for excludable public goods
• Stable networks
• A noncooperative coalitional bargaining game with random proposers
• A strategic model of social and economic networks
• Bargaining Foundations of Shapely Value
• Graphs and Cooperation in Games
• A Theory of Gradual Coalition Formation
• A Noncooperative Model of Network Formation
• A one-stage model of link formation and payoff division

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