Evolution in games with endogenous mistake probabilities.

DOI10.1006/JETH.2001.2941zbMath1035.91006OpenAlexW2100839242MaRDI QIDQ1867529

Joergen W. Weibull, Eric E. C. van Damme

Publication date: 2 April 2003

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://research.tilburguniversity.edu/en/publications/1c779ce9-9daa-4893-9ddb-e393d5800797

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionmutation ratesmistakes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (13)

Rapid evolution under inertia ⋮ The evolution of conventions under condition-dependent mistakes ⋮ Evolutionary bargaining with intentional idiosyncratic play ⋮ Evolutionarily rational mutations in structured populations ⋮ Coalitional stochastic stability ⋮ Evolutionary Game Theory ⋮ Robust stochastic stability ⋮ The logit-response dynamics ⋮ Cycles versus equilibrium in evolutionary games ⋮ Payoff-dependent mistakes and \(q\)-resistant equilibrium ⋮ Evolution of behavior when duopolists choose prices and quantities ⋮ Stochastic stability on general state spaces ⋮ Entropic penalties in finite games

Cites Work

• Strategy subsets closed under rational behavior
• Evolution with changing mutation rates
• Stochastic stability in games with alternative best replies
• Binary games with state dependent stochastic choice
• Efficient equilibrium selection in evolutionary games with random matching
• Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• The Evolution of Conventions
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
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