Strategy-proof probabilistic mechanisms in economies with pure public goods.

DOI10.1006/jeth.2001.2896zbMath1038.91032OpenAlexW2098229119MaRDI QIDQ1867532

Arunava Sen, H. J. M. Peters, Bhaskar Dutta

Publication date: 2 April 2003

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2896

zbMATH Keywords

public goodswelfare lossprobabilistic mechanismstrategy- proofness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18)

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