Public information, private information, and the multiplicity of equilibria in coordination games.
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Publication:1867549
DOI10.1006/JETH.2002.2947zbMath1033.91001OpenAlexW2032000314MaRDI QIDQ1867549
Publication date: 2 April 2003
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2002.2947
Related Items (12)
Coordination and private information revelation ⋮ Coordination and delay in global games ⋮ CURRENCY ATTACKS WITH MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA AND IMPERFECT INFORMATION: THE ROLE OF WAGE-SETTERS ⋮ Search, common knowledge, and competition ⋮ Observing each other's observations in a Bayesian coordination game ⋮ Does information transparency decrease coordination failure? ⋮ Risk sharing in public-private partnerships ⋮ Information acquisition in global games of regime change ⋮ Speculative attacks with multiple targets ⋮ Informational feedback between voting and speculative trading ⋮ Sentiments, strategic uncertainty, and information structures in coordination games ⋮ Regime change in large information networks
Cites Work
- Private and public information in self-fulfilling currency crises
- The law of large numbers with a continuum of i.i.d. random variables
- Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs
- Payoff continuity in incomplete information games
- Common \(p\)-belief: The general case
- Stochastic common learning
- Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
- Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity
- Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information
- The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information
- Does One Soros Make a Difference? A Theory of Currency Crises with Large and Small Traders
- p-Dominance and Belief Potential
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