\(p\)-dominance and equilibrium selection under perfect foresight dynamics.

DOI10.1006/jeth.2001.2955zbMath1033.91002OpenAlexW2122229300MaRDI QIDQ1867552

Daisuke Oyama

Publication date: 2 April 2003

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2955

zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium selection\(p\)-dominanceperfect foresight dynamics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Games with infinitely many players (91A07) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (12)

Applying the shortest-path-counting problem to evaluate the importance of city road segments and the connectedness of the network-structured system ⋮ \(p\)-best response set ⋮ Characterizing robust solutions in monotone games ⋮ ANTI-COORDINATION GAMES AND DYNAMIC STABILITY ⋮ Iterated generalized half-dominance and global game selection ⋮ Perfect foresight dynamics in games with linear incentives and time symmetry ⋮ Continuously stable strategies, neighborhood superiority and two-player games with continuous strategy space ⋮ Risk-dominance and perfect foresight dynamics in \(N\)-player games ⋮ Iterated potential and robustness of equilibria ⋮ History versus expectations in economic geography reconsidered ⋮ Rationalizable foresight dynamics ⋮ Generalized potentials and robust sets of equilibria

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