The package assignment model.

DOI10.1006/jeth.2001.2957zbMath1033.90064OpenAlexW2091507063MaRDI QIDQ1867556

Sushil Bikhchandani, Joseph M. Ostroy

Publication date: 2 April 2003

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/80e50ba5af59e33d5c139c22b199b74056a271ae

zbMATH Keywords

linear programmingnonlinear pricingWalrasian equilibriumthe coreassignment modelmulti-object auctions.Vickrey payments

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Linear programming (90C05) Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Discrete location and assignment (90B80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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