Iterated weak dominance in strictly competitive games of perfect information.

DOI10.1006/jeth.2001.2958zbMath1124.91301OpenAlexW2020405133MaRDI QIDQ1867561

Christian Ewerhart

Publication date: 2 April 2003

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2958

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05)

Related Items (4)

The role of aggregate information in a binary threshold game ⋮ Iterated Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies in Well-Founded Games ⋮ On the complexity of iterated weak dominance in constant-sum games ⋮ Iterated weak dominance and subgame dominance

Cites Work

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• Dominance elimination procedures on finite alternative games
• Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox
• On rationalizability in extensive games
• Chess-like games are dominance solvable in at most two steps
• Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
• Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes: A Comment
• A Theory of N -Person Games with Perfect Information

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