Dominance solvable English matching auctions.

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(01)00072-5zbMath1037.91038MaRDI QIDQ1867792

Ulrich Kamecke

Publication date: 2 April 2003

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

English auctionsstrategiesMatching marketsIterated elimination of dominated

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

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• Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
• Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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