Coalitional stability with a credibility constraint

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(01)00078-6zbMath1021.91003OpenAlexW2031341875MaRDI QIDQ1867798

Anindya Bhattacharya

Publication date: 2 April 2003

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(01)00078-6

zbMATH Keywords

proper simple gamescredibly consistent sets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (4)

Stability in dynamic matching markets ⋮ On coalition formation: durable coalition structures. ⋮ On credible coalitional deviations by prudent players ⋮ The stability set as a social choice correspondence.

Cites Work

• The stability set of voting games: Classification and genericity results
• Covering sets and a new Condorcet choice correspondence
• A consistent bargaining set
• Stability of decision systems under majority rule
• Stability of voting games
• Far-sightedness and the voting paradox
• Farsighted coalitional stability
• Equilibrium binding agreements
• Nonemptiness of the largest consistent set
• Coalitional stability under perfect foresight

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