Scoring rules cannot respect majority in choice and elimination simultaneously

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(01)00087-7zbMath1021.91015OpenAlexW2087230758MaRDI QIDQ1867805

M. Remzi Sanver

Publication date: 2 April 2003

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(01)00087-7

zbMATH Keywords

scoring rulesrespecting majority

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (6)

Negative voting social welfare functions: a characterization ⋮ A note on scoring rules that respect majority in choice and elimination. ⋮ The scoring rules in an endogenous election ⋮ The inverse plurality rule-an axiomatization ⋮ Minimal monotonic extensions of scoring rules ⋮ Approval voting under dichotomous preferences: a catalogue of characterizations

Cites Work

• The majoritarian compromise is majoritarian-optimal and subgame-perfect implementable
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