Stable agreements in infinitely repeated games

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(01)00089-0zbMath1023.91005MaRDI QIDQ1867807

Licun Xue

Publication date: 2 April 2003

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

coalitionsrepeated gamesrenegotiationagreements

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (2)

Conservative stable standards of behavior and \(\varphi\)-stable sets ⋮ On the foundation of stability

Cites Work

• Efficiency and renegotiation in repeated games
• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Strong perfect equilibrium in supergames
• Extending renegotiation-proofness to infinite horizon games
• Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games
• Renegotiation in repeated games
• An application of the theory of social situations to repeated games
• On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
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