Welfare asymptotics of the pivotal mechanism for excludable public goods.

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(01)00092-0zbMath1038.91031MaRDI QIDQ1867811

Tae Kun Seo, Indranil K. Ghosh, Rajat K. Deb

Publication date: 2 April 2003

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

public goodswelfare losspivotal mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18)

Related Items

The conservative equal costs rule, the serial cost sharing rule and the pivotal mechanism: asymptotic welfare loss comparisons for the case of an excludable public project, Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects

Cites Work

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