Nash consistent representation of constitutions: A reaction to the Gibbard paradox.
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Publication:1867814
DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(01)00095-6zbMath1048.91006OpenAlexW2034801438MaRDI QIDQ1867814
Bezalel Peleg, Ton Storcken, H. J. M. Peters
Publication date: 2 April 2003
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(01)00095-6
Related Items (8)
Representation of effectivity functions by acceptable game forms: a complete characterization ⋮ On the continuity of representations of effectivity functions ⋮ Representations of political power structures by strategically stable game forms: a survey ⋮ Binary effectivity rules ⋮ On existence of ex post Nash consistent representation for effectivity functions ⋮ Representation of constitutions under incomplete information ⋮ Book review of: Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters, Strategic social choice. Stable representations of constitutions ⋮ Nash consistent representation of effectivity functions through lottery models
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