On the model dependence of majority preference relations reconstructed from ballot or survey data

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(02)00022-7zbMath1032.91580WikidataQ57086478 ScholiaQ57086478MaRDI QIDQ1867823

Bernard Grofman, Michel Regenwetter, Anthony A. J. Marley

Publication date: 2 April 2003

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

VotingCondorcet criterionMajority ruleSurvey dataSemiordersWeak orders

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

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