A remark on bargaining and non-expected utility

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(02)00009-4zbMath1027.91008MaRDI QIDQ1867828

Oscar Volij

Publication date: 2 April 2003

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Dynamic consistencyBargainingCompound lotteries

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Games in extensive form (91A18) Utility theory (91B16)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Equilibrium without independence
• Bargaining and boldness
• Existence and dynamic consistency of Nash equilibrium with non-expected utility preferences
• On risk aversion and bargaining outcomes.
• Existence and uniqueness of ordinal Nash outcomes
• Epistemic conditions for equilibrium in beliefs without independence
• Bargaining solutions without the expected utility hypothesis
• The Bargaining Problem
• Two-Stage Lotteries without the Reduction Axiom
• "Making Book Against Oneself," The Independence Axiom, and Nonlinear Utility Theory
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• On the Interpretation of the Nash Bargaining Solution and Its Extension to Non-Expected Utility Preferences
• Time Preference
• Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium
• A Cardinal Characterization of the Rubinstein-Safra-Thomson Axiomatic Bargaining Theory

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