Manipulability of the men- (women-) optimal matching rule via endowments

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(02)00007-0zbMath1027.91061OpenAlexW2092245450MaRDI QIDQ1867834

Murat R. Sertel, İpek Özkal-Sanver

Publication date: 2 April 2003

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(02)00007-0

zbMATH Keywords

MatchingManipulationEndowments

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (10)

Incentives in landing slot problems ⋮ Manipulation of optimal matchings via predonation of endowment ⋮ Manipulation via endowments in exchange markets with indivisible goods ⋮ The manipulability of matching rules via segmentation ⋮ Manipulation via endowments in auctions with multiple goods ⋮ Bundling in exchange markets with indivisible goods ⋮ Application fee manipulations in matching markets ⋮ The \(n\)-person Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution under pre-donations ⋮ Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation ⋮ Implementing matching rules by type pretension mechanisms

Cites Work

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• Manipulation through bribes
• The Nash bargaining solution manipulated by pre-donations is Talmudic
• Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• Manipulation via Endowments
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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