The stability set as a social choice correspondence.
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Publication:1867836
DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(02)00010-0zbMath1038.91028MaRDI QIDQ1867836
Mathieu Martin, Vincent R. Merlin
Publication date: 2 April 2003
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items (8)
A note on the non-emptiness of the stability set when individual preferences are weak orders ⋮ Single-crossing choice correspondences ⋮ On coalition formation: durable coalition structures. ⋮ Modeling country risk ratings using partial orders ⋮ Cooperation, stability and social welfare under majority rule ⋮ A core of voting games with improved foresight ⋮ Stability analysis of group decision-making under weighted scoring rules ⋮ SOCIAL CHOICE AND COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY: VOTING GAMES AS SOCIAL AGGREGATION FUNCTIONS
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