On the epistemic foundation for backward induction
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Publication:1867838
DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(02)00011-2zbMath1027.91006MaRDI QIDQ1867838
Publication date: 2 April 2003
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
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