Farsighted stability in average return games

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(02)00013-6zbMath1032.91011OpenAlexW2055054781MaRDI QIDQ1867843

Takeshi Masuda

Publication date: 2 April 2003

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(02)00013-6

zbMATH Keywords

Pareto efficiencylargest consistent setIndividual rationalityAverage return gameFarsighted stable set

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Related Items (6)

Farsightedly stable tariffs ⋮ Farsighted stable sets in Hotelling's location games ⋮ Cooperative Games (Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets) ⋮ Single-payoff farsighted stable sets in strategic games with dominant punishment strategies ⋮ Farsighted coalitional stability in TU-games ⋮ Maximin, minimax, and von Neumann-Morgenstern farsighted stable sets

Cites Work

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• Farsighted coalitional stability
• Coalitional stability under perfect foresight
• On the uniqueness of equilibrium in Cournot oligopoly and other games
• An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition

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