Coordination in an email game without ``Almost common knowledge

DOI10.1023/A:1021180407318zbMath1030.91004OpenAlexW1569224778MaRDI QIDQ1868486

Nicola Dimitri

Publication date: 27 April 2003

Published in: Journal of Logic, Language and Information (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1021180407318

zbMATH Keywords

mediationcommunicationchoiceefficiencyinformationknowledgecoordinationgamesrisk-dominanceemail

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Related Items (1)

Efficiency and equilibrium in the electronic mail game; the general case

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