On the (Sample) Condorcet efficiency of majority rule: An alternative view of majority cycles and social homogeneity

DOI10.1023/A:1021215903030zbMath1032.91583OpenAlexW1593663592MaRDI QIDQ1869599

James Adams, Bernard Grofman, Michel Regenwetter

Publication date: 28 April 2003

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1021215903030

zbMATH Keywords

samplingrepresentationCondorcet efficiencysocial homogeneitymajority cycles

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (3)

Similarity Suppresses Cyclicity: Why Similar Competitors Form Hierarchies ⋮ A general concept of majority rule ⋮ On the model dependence of majority preference relations reconstructed from ballot or survey data

This page was built for publication: On the (Sample) Condorcet efficiency of majority rule: An alternative view of majority cycles and social homogeneity