Mechanism, truth, and Penrose's new argument

DOI10.1023/A:1022863925321zbMath1022.03001MaRDI QIDQ1871136

Stewart Shapiro

Publication date: 6 May 2003

Published in: Journal of Philosophical Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

truth theoryLucasPenrosecomputer mechanismGödelian consequencesincompleteness of \(A^2\)intensional mathematics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05)

Related Items

The modal argument for hypercomputing minds, A new Gödelian argument for hypercomputing minds based on the busy beaver problem, Remarks on Penrose's ``new argument, A metasemantic challenge for mathematical determinacy

Cites Work

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• Ultramaximalist minimalism!
• Outline of a Theory of Truth
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• Transfinite recursive progressions of axiomatic theories
• Systems of Logic Based on Ordinals^†
• Penrose's new argument
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