Folk theorems in multicriteria repeated \(N\)-person games.

DOI10.1007/BF02579020zbMath1051.91005MaRDI QIDQ1871421

Justo Puerto, Leon A. Petrosyan

Publication date: 13 July 2003

Published in: Top (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

multicriteria-Nash equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Decision theory for games (91A35)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Technical note: Games with vector payoffs
• Multicriteria dynamic programming with an application to the integer case
• Domination structures and multicriteria problems in N-person games
• A perfectness concept for multicriteria games
• Existence of a Pareto equilibrium
• The folk theorem for finitely repeated games with mixed strategies
• Vector linear programming in zero-sum multicriteria matrix games
• Preference Order Dynamic Programming
• The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A Neu Condition
• Equilibrium points in n -person games

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