Set-valued TU-games

DOI10.1016/S0377-2217(03)00398-9zbMath1067.90068WikidataQ58217309 ScholiaQ58217309MaRDI QIDQ1876169

Miguel A. Hinojosa, Francisco Ramón Fernández García, Justo Puerto

Publication date: 16 August 2004

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Game theoryCoreMultiobjective analysis

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

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