A characterization of the core of convex games through Gâteaux derivatives
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Publication:1876642
DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00258-8zbMath1117.91310OpenAlexW2043494818MaRDI QIDQ1876642
Luigi Montrucchio, Massimo Marinacci
Publication date: 20 August 2004
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00258-8
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