Collusion and discrimination in organizations

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2003.07.002zbMath1070.91036OpenAlexW1972422515MaRDI QIDQ1876651

Shingo Ishiguro

Publication date: 20 August 2004

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2003.07.002

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardMulti-agentRelative performance evaluation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (5)

Collusion and discrimination in organizations ⋮ Supervisory efficiency and collusion in a multiple-agent hierarchy ⋮ Team incentives with imperfect mutual inference ⋮ Collusion in homogeneous and heterogeneous tournaments ⋮ On the efficiency of hurdle rate-based coordination mechanisms

Cites Work

• Decentralization and collusion
• Coalitions, incentives, and risk sharing
• Collusion and discrimination in organizations
• Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information
• Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents

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