A model of political parties

DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00254-0zbMath1073.91063OpenAlexW2089688583MaRDI QIDQ1876654

Gilat Levy

Publication date: 20 August 2004

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00254-0

zbMATH Keywords

Coalition formationMultidimensional policy spacePolitical parties

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) History, political science (91F10)

Related Items (22)

Divergent platforms ⋮ The interplay between transitivity and completeness: generalized \textsf{NaP}-preferences ⋮ On the benefits of party competition ⋮ Endogenous platforms: the case of many parties ⋮ Scalarization methods and expected multi-utility representations ⋮ Introduction to the symposium in political economy ⋮ A spatial theory of party formation ⋮ Intra-party decision making, party formation, and moderation in multiparty systems ⋮ On the multi-utility representation of preference relations ⋮ A coalitional theory of unemployment insurance and employment protection ⋮ Competition and networks of collaboration ⋮ Indifference or indecisiveness? Choice-theoretic foundations of incomplete preferences ⋮ Strategic party formation on a circle and Duverger's law ⋮ Divide and rule: redistribution in a model with differentiated candidates ⋮ Electoral competition with uncertainty averse parties ⋮ Secondary issues and party politics: an application to environmental policy ⋮ A theory of income taxation where politicians focus upon core and swing voters ⋮ Voting blocs, party discipline and party formation ⋮ A model of political voting behaviours across different countries ⋮ Fuzzy politics. I: The genesis of parties ⋮ Reaching across the aisle to block reforms ⋮ Party formation and coalitional bargaining in a model of proportional representation

Cites Work

• Equilibrium in abstract economies without ordered preferences
• Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control
• A theory of endogenous coalition structures
• Equilibrium binding agreements
• Stable coalition structures with externalities
• Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
• Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
• An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
• The Democratic Political Economy of Progressive Income Taxation
• Party Formation and Policy Outcomes under Different Electoral Systems
• N‐person games in partition function form
• On a Class of Equilibrium Conditions for Majority Rule
• A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates

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