The strategy-proof provision of public goods under congestion and crowding preferences
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Publication:1876655
DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00223-0zbMath1088.91025OpenAlexW1971232271MaRDI QIDQ1876655
Antonio Nicolò, Matthew O. Jackson
Publication date: 20 August 2004
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00223-0
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