Balanced Bayesian mechanisms

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2003.07.001zbMath1073.91047OpenAlexW2097612156MaRDI QIDQ1876661

Louis-André Gérard-Varet, Claude d'Aspremont, Jacques Crémer

Publication date: 20 August 2004

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/2377/1/Cremer_2377.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian incentive compatibilityBayesian implementationMechanism design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Bayesian problems; characterization of Bayes procedures (62C10) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (9)

Mechanism design with information acquisition ⋮ Mechanism design with side payments: individual rationality and iterative dominance ⋮ Interim efficient auctions with interdependent valuations ⋮ Some Remarks on Bayesian Mechanism Design ⋮ Individually rational, budget-balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus ⋮ Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types ⋮ A note on budget balance under interim participation constraints: The case of independent types ⋮ Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: an analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces ⋮ Optimal crowdfunding design

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