Match choice and Ghettoization in evolutionary games

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2003.09.007zbMath1089.91062OpenAlexW1978442121MaRDI QIDQ1877155

Nathan Larson

Publication date: 16 August 2004

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2003.09.007

zbMATH Keywords

agentcoordination gamesselective matching

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• Evolutionary dynamics with aggregate shocks
• Strategy-specific barriers to learning and nonmonotonic selection dynamics
• Efficient equilibrium selection in evolutionary games with random matching
• Learning from Neighbours
• Word-of-Mouth Communication and Social Learning
• An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-Play Communication
• Cooperation in Community Interaction without Information Flows
• Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• The Evolution of Conventions

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