Strategic candidacy for multivalued voting procedures

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2003.09.005zbMath1105.91013OpenAlexW1972648113MaRDI QIDQ1877156

Andrew McLennan, Hülya Eraslan

Publication date: 16 August 2004

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2003.09.005

zbMATH Keywords

Gibbard-Satterthwaite theoremArrow's theoremPolitical economyVotingCandidate stabilityCandidate withdrawal

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (4)

Social choice correspondences with infinitely many agents: serial dictatorship ⋮ An undominated Nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit ⋮ Candidate stability and voting correspondences ⋮ A unifying impossibility theorem

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