The relevance of private information in mechanism design
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Publication:1877157
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2003.09.001zbMath1094.91038OpenAlexW2150744951MaRDI QIDQ1877157
Publication date: 16 August 2004
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2003.09.001
Public goods (91B18) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)
Related Items (27)
Mechanism design with information acquisition ⋮ The generic possibility of full surplus extraction in models with large type spaces ⋮ Impact of higher-order uncertainty ⋮ Correlated information, mechanism design and informational rents ⋮ Mechanism design with interdependent valuations: surplus extraction ⋮ Informational smallness and the scope for limiting information rents ⋮ Information acquisition and full surplus extraction ⋮ Equity and adverse selection with correlated costs ⋮ The effectiveness of English auctions. ⋮ Continuous level-\(k\) mechanism design ⋮ Continuous implementation with payoff knowledge ⋮ Knightian games and robustness to ambiguity ⋮ On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure ⋮ Surplus extraction with rich type spaces ⋮ Beliefs, payoffs, information: on the robustness of the BDP property in models with endogenous beliefs ⋮ Individually rational, budget-balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus ⋮ Ex post implementation ⋮ Mechanism design with multidimensional, continuous types and interdependent valuations ⋮ Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types ⋮ Exploring the scope of neurometrically informed mechanism design ⋮ Locally robust implementation and its limits ⋮ Multidimensional private value auctions ⋮ Public goods with congestion ⋮ When do types induce the same belief hierarchy? ⋮ Uncertainty and robustness of surplus extraction ⋮ Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: an analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces ⋮ Modeling secrecy and deception in a multiple-period attacker-defender signaling game
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- Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
- Optimal Auction Design
- Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
- Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
- Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium
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