Rates of information aggregation in common value auctions

DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00224-2zbMath1087.91018OpenAlexW2117374160MaRDI QIDQ1877164

Han Hong, Matthew Shum

Publication date: 16 August 2004

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00224-2

zbMATH Keywords

convergence ratesinformation aggregationlarge auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (4)

The impact of competition on prices with numerous firms ⋮ Information aggregation in auctions with an unknown number of bidders ⋮ Competitive rational expectations equilibria without apology ⋮ Large auctions with risk-averse bidders

Cites Work

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• Common-value auctions with discrete private information
• Extremes and related properties of random sequences and processes
• A Convergence Theorem for Competitive Bidding with Differential Information
• Limit Distributions for Order Statistics. I
• Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition
• Asymptotic Statistics
• The Loser's Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions
• Estimation When a Parameter is on a Boundary
• Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions
• Note on the Consistency of the Maximum Likelihood Estimate

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