A necessary and sufficient condition for non-emptiness of the core of a non-transferable utility game
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1877166
DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00261-8zbMath1070.91009OpenAlexW3125789505MaRDI QIDQ1877166
Arkadi Predtetchinski, P. Jean-Jacques Herings
Publication date: 16 August 2004
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00261-8
Related Items (33)
A weak \(\alpha\)-core existence theorem of generalized games with infinitely many players and pseudo-utilities ⋮ Socially structured games ⋮ Stable allocations of risk ⋮ The core-partition of a hedonic game ⋮ Cooperative game with nondeterministic returns ⋮ A cooperative game with envy ⋮ Some infinite-player generalizations of Scarf's theorem: finite-coalition \(\alpha\)-cores and weak \(\alpha\)-cores ⋮ Convex and exact games with non-transferable utility ⋮ Non-emptiness of the fuzzy core in a finite production economy with infinite-dimensional commodity space ⋮ Allocation in multi-agenda disputes: a set-valued games approach ⋮ A note on the core ⋮ A necessary and sufficient condition for an NTU fuzzy game to have a non-empty fuzzy core ⋮ Balancedness conditions for exact games ⋮ Small group effectiveness, per capita boundedness and nonemptiness of approximate cores ⋮ Partially ordered cooperative games: Extended core and Shapley value ⋮ Existence of fuzzy cores and generalizations of the K-K-M-S theorem ⋮ A note on solution concepts for nontransferable utility games ⋮ Decomposing a balanced game: a necessary and sufficient condition for the nonemptiness of the core ⋮ On the non-emptiness of the fuzzy core ⋮ Negotiation, preferences over agreements, and the core ⋮ THE EXTENDED CORE OF A COOPERATIVE NTU GAME ⋮ Payoff-dependent balancedness and cores ⋮ An efficient multi-item dynamic auction with budget constrained bidders ⋮ How to efficiently allocate houses under price controls? ⋮ The unbinding core for coalitional form games ⋮ On the nonemptiness of approximate cores of large games ⋮ The non-emptiness of the weak sequential core of a transferable utility game with uncertainty ⋮ A model of partnership formation ⋮ Efficiency, stability, and commitment in senior level job matching markets ⋮ A weak \(\alpha \)-core existence theorem of games with nonordered preferences and a continuum of agents ⋮ Nontransferable utility bankruptcy games ⋮ A NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR THE NON-EMPTINESS OF THE SOCIALLY STABLE CORE IN STRUCTURED TU-GAMES ⋮ Characterizations of the core of TU and NTU games with communication structures
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- The core of a cooperative game without side payments
- An extremely simple proof of the K-K-M-S theorem
- Cooperative games in permutational structure
- The average tree solution for cooperative games with communication structure
- The Core of an N Person Game
- Some theorems on the core of ann-Game without Side-Payments
This page was built for publication: A necessary and sufficient condition for non-emptiness of the core of a non-transferable utility game
