Contractual distortions in a market with frictions

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2003.07.004zbMath1070.91035OpenAlexW2078471920MaRDI QIDQ1877170

Roman Inderst

Publication date: 16 August 2004

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2003.07.004

zbMATH Keywords

ScreeningContract designCountervailing incentives

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Monopoly and product quality
• Are two a good representative for many?
• Participation constraints in adverse selection models
• Countervailing incentives in agency problems
• On countervailing incentives
• Screening in a Matching Market
• On the Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment
• Dynamic Markets with Competitive Bidding
• Non-Existence of Single-Wage Equilibria in Search Models with Adverse Selection
• On the Equivalence of Walrasian and Non-Walrasian Equilibria in Contract Markets: The Case of Complete Contracts
• Nonlinear Pricing with Random Participation

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