The relationship between the allocation of goods and a seller's revenue

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2003.12.002zbMath1086.91024OpenAlexW2079523104MaRDI QIDQ1877826

Matthew O. Jackson, Ilan Kremer

Publication date: 19 August 2004

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2003.12.002

zbMATH Keywords

asymptotic analysisauctionmechanism designallocations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (4)

On the informational inefficiency of discriminatory price auctions ⋮ Selling shares to retail investors: auction vs. fixed price ⋮ On the lowest-winning-bid and the highest-losing-bid auctions ⋮ Large auctions with risk-averse bidders

Cites Work

• Asymptotically strategy-proof Walrasian exchange
• Efficiency and information aggregation in auctions with costly information
• Simple strategy-proof approximately Walrasian mechanisms
• Asymptotic revenue equivalence in auctions
• The Relevance of a Choice of Auction Format in a Competitive Environment
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Bundling Decisions by a Multiproduct Monopolist with Incomplete Information
• Optimal Auction Design
• Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
• Property Rights and Efficiency of Voluntary Bargaining under Asymmetric Information
• Convergence to Efficiency in a Simple Market with Incomplete Information
• The Loser's Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions
• Communication and Equilibrium in Discontinuous Games of Incomplete Information

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