Duality in procurement design

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2003.11.005zbMath1073.91025OpenAlexW2007098892MaRDI QIDQ1877829

Alejandro M. Manelli, Daniel R. Vincent

Publication date: 19 August 2004

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2003.11.005

zbMATH Keywords

DualityLinear programmingBargainingAuctionsMechanism designProcurement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Analyzing auction and bargaining mechanisms in e-procurement with supply quality risk

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Multidimensional auctions
• On the regulation of procurement bids
• Multidimensional mechanism design: revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly
• Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-good monopolist
• Bargaining under Asymmetric Information
• Optimal Auction Design
• Optimal Procurement Mechanisms

This page was built for publication: Duality in procurement design