Stable international environmental agreements with a stock pollutant, uncertainty and learning
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Publication:1878303
DOI10.1023/B:RISK.0000031445.13939.E4zbMath1074.91036OpenAlexW1987763571MaRDI QIDQ1878303
Publication date: 19 August 2004
Published in: Journal of Risk and Uncertainty (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1023/b:risk.0000031445.13939.e4
uncertaintylearninginternational environmental agreementsself-enforcing agreementsfixed membershipvariable membership
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The effects of the length of the period of commitment on the size of stable international environmental agreements ⋮ Simulating a sequential coalition formation process for the climate change problem: first come, but second served? ⋮ Sticks and carrots for the design of international climate agreements with renegotiations ⋮ COLLABORATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
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