The philosophical significance of Cox's theorem

DOI10.1016/j.ijar.2003.11.001zbMath1093.68113OpenAlexW2086664475MaRDI QIDQ1879780

Mark Colyvan

Publication date: 23 September 2004

Published in: International Journal of Approximate Reasoning (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijar.2003.11.001

zbMATH Keywords

probability measuremeasure of belief

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Reasoning under uncertainty in the context of artificial intelligence (68T37)

Related Items (3)

Bridging the intuition gap in Cox's theorem: a Jaynesian argument for universality ⋮ From propositional logic to plausible reasoning: a uniqueness theorem ⋮ Agent Uncertainty Model and Quantum Mechanics Representation: Non-locality Modeling

Cites Work

• From classical to intuitionistic probability
• The logical view of conditioning and its application to possibility and evidence theories
• Semantic alternatives in partial Boolean quantum logic
• Vagueness, truth and logic
• Logics for knowledge, possibility, and existence
• Constructing a logic of plausible inference: A guide to Cox's theorem.
• A paraconsistent theory of belief revision
• The logic of inexact concepts
• Some things do not exist
• Intuitionism. An introduction. 3rd revised ed
• Scoring Rules and the Inevitability of Probability
• The Uncertain Reasoner's Companion
• Indeterminacy, Degree of Belief, and Excluded Middle
• Probability, Frequency and Reasonable Expectation
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