On Pareto equilibria in vector-valued extensive form games

DOI10.1007/s001860300305zbMath1083.91040OpenAlexW2056719168MaRDI QIDQ1880254

Thomas Krieger

Publication date: 22 September 2004

Published in: Mathematical Methods of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001860300305

zbMATH Keywords

Pareto equilibriaScalarization methodMulticriteria gamesSubgame perfectnessVector-valued extensive form games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Games in extensive form (91A18)

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A game model based on multi-attribute aggregation ⋮ Acyclic Preferences and Existence of Sequential Nash Equilibria: A Formal and Constructive Equivalence ⋮ On the multi-utility representation of preference relations ⋮ Equilibria in multi-player multi-outcome infinite sequential games ⋮ Nondominated equilibrium solutions of a multiobjective two-person nonzero-sum game in extensive form and corresponding mathematical programming problem

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