Choosing the level of a public good when agents have an outside option
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Publication:1884638
DOI10.1007/s00355-003-0228-8zbMath1101.91024OpenAlexW1992954477MaRDI QIDQ1884638
Publication date: 5 November 2004
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-003-0228-8
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The strategy-proof provision of public goods under congestion and crowding preferences ⋮ On update monotone, continuous, and consistent collective evaluation rules ⋮ Single-dipped preferences with satiation: strong group strategy-proofness and unanimity ⋮ On Nash implementability in allotment economies under domain restrictions with indifference ⋮ Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement ⋮ The separability principle in single-peaked economies with participation constraints ⋮ Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: on what domains are they also sufficient? ⋮ The division problem with voluntary participation ⋮ Top monotonicity: a common root for single peakedness, single crossing and the median voter result ⋮ The capacity constrained facility location problem ⋮ The relation between monotonicity and strategy-proofness ⋮ Priorities in the location of multiple public facilities ⋮ Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences
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