Room assignment-rent division: a market approach

DOI10.1007/s00355-003-0231-0zbMath1101.91025OpenAlexW3021604157MaRDI QIDQ1884639

M. Utku Ünver, Atila Abdulkadiroğlu, Tayfun Sönmez

Publication date: 5 November 2004

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-003-0231-0

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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